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The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the the-
sis. The reasons for conducting the research will be pre-
sented, the specific research question to be investigated
will be stated, some special terminology will be defined,
and the method of research will be described.
Reason for Conducting the Research
The United States Navy has been building and oper-
ating ships since the Revolutionary War . In spite of the
vast shipbuilding experience of the United States Navy,
shipbuilding projects have persistently experienced changes
to the ship during construction. These changes have, in
general, resulted in cost growth. It is rare that a ship is
delivered to the Navy at a cost less than that estimated
during the design phases of the ship acquisition project.
It should be emphasized that cost growth, or cost
"overrun," is not a new problem. USS Constitution, "Old
Ironsides," was authorized by the United States Congress in
1794, along with five other frigates. A total of $688,889
was appropriated for construction of the six ships [35]
.
The appropriation was based on several assumptions regarding
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material availability. These assumptions proved to be erron-
eous within a few months. In particular, live oak for con-
struction of these ships proved to be very difficult to get.
In addition, changing requirements for the fledgling United
States Navy resulted in cancellation of three ships, and
diversion of some of the materials to the three ships remain-
ing in the program.
The USS Constitution was launched in 1797, and subse-
quently delivered to the Navy at a final cost of $30 2,719
[35] . The delivered cost of three ships was slightly over
$902,000, compared to $688,889 appropriated for six ships.
There are many reasons for cost growth in ship acqui-
sition programs, including change in quantity, improvements,
and correction of deficiencies in the ship system design.
During the decade of the 1960's, the 9iip Construction Navy
(SCN) funding for new construction and conversion of Naval
ships proved to be inadequate due to cost growth. The under-
lying reasons for the cost growth were investigated, and in
1969 the SCN Pricing and Cost Control Study [45] reported
that inadequate contract plans and specifications were a
major cause of the funding deficiency in the SCN program.
Commander A. C. Meiners, Jr., conducted an extensive
study of the causes of cost growth in weapon systems acqui-
sition in his 1974 George Washington University dissertation
[36] . Meiners reported that incomplete plans and specifica-
tions at the time of contract award ranked second out of
thirteen causes of cost growth; exceeded only by changes in
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operational requirements causing a change in the weapon
system, other than quantity. Change in quantity was not
included among the thirteen causes investigated by Meiners.
The SCN Pricing and Cost Control Study recommended in
1969 that the Navy improve in-house design and specification
writing capability. In addition, a formal evaluation of the
entire ship specification was recommended. These recommenda-
tions have contributed to an increase in the scope of effort
expended in Naval ship system design since 1969, and in the
cost of developing contract plans and specifications. In
spite of this increase in the scope and cost of ship system
design effort, the Navy Marine Acquisition Review Committee
(NMARC) recommended in January, 1975, that the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA) continue emphasis on increasing the
scope of design effort going into contract plans and specifi-
cations [43] .
Statement of the Research Question
Meiner's study, and the NMARC recommendation to con-
tinue increasing the scope of ship system design effort, sug-
gest the question, "What is the correct scope of ship system
design effort to expend in preparation of contract plans and
specifications? H More simply stated, "How much design is
enough?" Increasing the scope of ship system design effort
should reduce the cost of changes caused by deficiencies in
the contract plans and specifications, but the magnitude of
cost savings resulting from increased design effort is
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unknown. Spaulding and Johnson ask, "How much design is
enough?" in their February, 1976, article on Ship Design
Management, and state further that a measure of design cost
effectiveness must be developed [51] . The object of this
thesis is to develop a measure of Naval ship system design
cost effectiveness in order to answer the question, "How
much design is enough?"
Corollary questions related to the principal research
question of "How much design is enough?" include:
1. Can acquisition cost be decreased by increas-
ing the scope of design effort?
2. Does sufficient design capacity exist to sup-
port an increase in the scope of design
effort?
The primary effort of this research will be to answer
the principal question of "How much design is enough?" Corol-
lary questions will be addressed to the extent feasible.
Special Terminology and Acronymns
This thesis will include language and acronymns unique
to the Naval ship system design and acquisition process. The
following definitions are provided to aid the reader.
Naval Ship System Design is the design effort
expended between the initiation of feasi-
bility studies and the completion of con-
tract design, and does not include detail
design performed by the shipbuilder after
contract award.
Naval Ship System Design Deficiency is any
technical or editorial error In the con-




engineering mistakes, infeasible weight
and space allocations, and inadequate or
unclear system definition.
Design to Cost is a design constraint imposed
on the Naval ship system design process
requiring the ship acquisition cost to
be less than a specified amount.
Fly Before Buy is a constraint placed on the
weapons system acquisition process pro-
hibiting initiation of weapons production
until prototype tests are satisfactorily
completed. In the case of shipbuilding,
true prototyping is not feasible; there-
fore, "Fly Before Buy" is complied with
by extensive land based testing of crit-
ical subsystems during lead-ship con-
struction, and by incorporating lead-
ship detail design and construction
experience into the follow-ship contract
design.
Total Package Procurement is a weapon system
acquisition strategy that places total
responsibility for system design, con-
struction, and demonstration of specified
performance on the builder. The builder
assumes all risks involved in sub-system
development and integration and is re-
quired to provide a performance warranty
on the finished product.
Concept Formulation/Contract Definition is a
system design process developed to sup-
port the total package procurement acqui-
sition strategy. The concept formula-
tion phase is an in-house Navy effort to
develop the system performance specifica-
tions. The contract definition phase is
a three-step process during which compet-
ing contractors present plans for execut-
ing a system design, then execute the
system design, and finally translate the
design into detail specifications and a
contract for production.
OPNAV is the office of the Chief of Naval
Operations
.
NAVSEC is the Naval Ship Engineering Center,
Hyattsville, Maryland. NAVSEC performs
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the function of Design Agent for the Navy,
under the control of the Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA)
.
Ship Acquisition Cost is the total cost of
acquiring and delivering a ship system to
the Navy including all payments to the
shipbuilder, cost of all government design
and development, government furnished
material and information, fitting out,
spare parts placed on board the ship, and
post-shakedown availability work.
CG26 is the USS Belknap, formerly DLG26
.
CGN36 is the USS South Carolina, formerly DLGN36
.
CGN38 is the USS Virginia, formerly DLGN38.
FF1052 is the USS Knox, formerly DE10 52.
FFG7 is the Patrol Frigate USS Oliver Hazard
Perry presently under construction at
Bath, Maine, formerly PF109.
TLR is a document jointly produced during the
conceptual design phase by OPNAV and
NAVSEC, establishing the Top Level Require-
ments for a ship system. The TLR describes
the ship system performance characteristics
in operator language and establishes design
constraints and guidance.
TLS is a document developed by NAVSEC during
the preliminary design phase, establishing
the Top Level Specifications describing
the ship system in engineering language.
ILS is Integrated Logistic Support; the plan-
ning of crew training, spare parts stock-
age, and off-ship maintenance and repair
support for a ship.
RMA is Reliability, Maintainability, and Avail-
abTlity analysis involving the application
of probability theory to systems to pre-
dict frequency and duration of system
failures.
T&E is Test and Evaluation of systems, sub-
systems, and" components for the purpose of
system integration, and qualification for
Naval service. Test and Evaluation ranges
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from whole ship system testing during shake-
down and operational evaluation, to shock
testing of an individual equipment or com-
ponent to qualify that equipment or com-
ponent for Naval service
.
PSARC is the Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council. DSARC evaluation and approval is
required at least three times during every
weapon system acquisition program. DSARC
review occurs after concept selection,
upon completion of preliminary design,
prior to prototype (or lead-ship) con-
struction, and prior to full scale pro-
duction (follow-ship construction) . Addi-
tional DSARC reviews may be scheduled at
other checkpoints in the weapon acquisi-
tion program [32]
.
CDRL is Contract Data Requirements List; CDRL
is a complete lisEing of all design data,
drawings, technical manuals, operating
instructions, etc., that the contractor
is required to provide to the Navy as part
of the contractual obligation.
GFE is Government Furnished Equipment. GFE
includes all equipments and subsystems
furnished to a shipbuilder by the govern-
ment, and usually includes all weapon
subsystems, sensors, command and control
electronics, communications electronics,
and all nuclear power subsystem compo-
nents . Additional components and sub-
systems have been added to the above list
for some ship acquisition programs. Occa-
sionally the amount of GFE is less than
listed above, as in the case of a Total
Package Procurement.
GFI is Government Furnished Information and
includes contract plans and specifications,
and all technical documentation required
for the shipbuilder to install and inte-
grate GFE into an operational ship system.
Cost Estimating Classes are a system of classi-
fying cost estimates by level of estimat-
ing quality. The cost estimate classes
currently in use are: [4 2]
Class F ; Quick cost estimates prepared
in the absence of the minimum design and
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cost information package, based on gross
approximate parameters. Typically,
estimates are generally calculated by
merely escalating to current dollars an
empirical cost for a similar ship and
adding factors for expected changes in
design, accounting procedures or other
economic considerations
.
Class E : An estimating process when cost
and design information is developed by
use of a computer model which grossly
determines ship specifications from a
given set of input characteristics. In
general, the output cost and design in-
formation is calculated from estimating
relationships through a series of equa-
tions while payload type items such as
electronics, ordnance, etc., are costed
by a shopping list technique within the
model.
Class D : An estimate of a lower quality
than a Class C estimate due to an insuf-
ficiency in the design, procurement or
cost information primarily the result of
a need for an estimate before such infor-
mation can be further developed to justify
a C classification. Such early estimates
are usually exploratory in nature and are
prepared to perform trade-offs and cost
effectiveness analysis, to establish
notional ship characteristics and for
costing the program objectives in the out-
years where there is an absence of suf-
ficient design development.
Class C : The highest level of cost esti-
mates attainable in the planning, pro-
gramming and budgeting process. A Class C
estimate is the recommended level for
estimates of cost to be used in the budget
submission especially at the Congressional
level, preferably for the NAVCOMPT and
OSD/BOB submissions and whenever feasible
for the program objective estimates for
the current budget year
Class B : An estimate prepared to validate
the " reasonab lene s s " of cost estimates
received from contractors or government
shipyards. Prepared immediately prior to
a bid opening or upon receipt of an initial
cost estimate from a Naval shipyard.
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Class A ; An extensive cost estimate pre-
pared to validate an end cost estimate;
for determination of a "fair and reason-
able " price for comparison to contractors
prices; but primarily for contract nego-
tiation purposes . It is always prepared
in the post-budget process and generally
prior to a bid opening or scheduled nego-
tiation of fixed price incentive or cost
plus type contracts. This level of cost
estimate requires contract plans and speci-
fications and a detailed contract design




Development of a measure of ship system design cost-
effectiveness requires the development of a measure of cost
and a measure of effectiveness. The cost of ship system
design is readily available for several classes of Naval
ships. Measuring the effectiveness of ship system design is
more difficult. The military worth per dollar invested in
acquisition and ownership is a measure of ship system design
effectiveness; however, measuring the military worth of a
Naval ship in terms of dollars presents formidable problems.
It is theoretically possible to measure the military worth
of a Naval ship through the application of multiattribute
utility theory, but the practical application of multiattri-
bute utility theory to a system as complex as a multimission
Naval ship is an extremely large undertaking, and is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
This thesis will concentrate on one measure of ship
system design effectiveness; the cost of contract changes
caused by errors, omissions, inconsistencies, or other
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deficiencies in the contract plans and specifications pro-
duced by the ship system design effort.
Three distinctly different approaches to Naval ship
system design have been used since 1960 . Each of these
approaches will be described, and the differences will be
examined. Ship system design tasks common to all three
approaches will be identified. The cost of the design
tasks common to the three different approaches will be pre-
sented for several classes of Naval ships. The cost of con-
tract changes required to correct design deficiencies in the
contract plans and specifications will also be presented.
With the ship system design cost and the cost of correcting
ship system design deficiencies thus established, a cost-
effectiveness function for those design tasks common to all
three approaches will be developed. The cost effectiveness
of design tasks not common to all three design approaches
will not be determined.
Organization of Thesis
Chapter II will discuss three different approaches
to Naval ship system design, and will identify the work
tasks common to all three approaches.
Chapter III will present the cost of ship system
design for several classes of Naval ships. The cost of work
tasks not common to all three design approaches will be
identified and segregated from total ship system design
costs. The cost of the design tasks common to all three
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approaches will be adjusted for inflation by applying a cost
index based on the cost per man-day of design effort. The
design cost will be presented in constant Fiscal Year 1976
dollars.
The acquisition cost of the lead ship of each class
under investigation will be presented, along with the aver-
age acquisition cost per ship for each class. The acquisi-
tion cost will be adjusted for inflation by applying a ship-
building cost index developed from material and labor cost
indices. The acquisition costs will be presented in con-
stant Fiscal Year 1976 dollars.
The cost of ship system design elements common to all
three design approaches will be expressed as a percentage of
ship acquisition cost for each ship class, in order to take
into account differences in ship system complexity. Ship
system acquisition cost is proportional to ship system com-
plexity, and ship system design cost is proportional to
ship system complexity. By expressing ship system design
cost in percent of ship system acquisition cost, the effect
of ship system complexity is taken into account for a given
type of ship. Combatant ships and auxiliary ships will be
treated as disparate types.
Chapter IV will discuss the method of collecting data
on the cost of contract changes caused by deficiencies in
the contract plans and specifications, and present the data
collected. The cost of changes caused by design deficien-
cies will be adjusted for inflation by applying the ship

21
building cost index from the chronological midpoint of ship
construction to mid-1976. The cost data will be presented
in constant Fiscal Year 1976 dollars and in percent of lead
ship and average ship acquisition cost.
The cost of changes caused by deficiencies in con-
tract plans and specifications is proportional to ship
system complexity. The effect of ship system complexity is
taken into account by expressing the cost of changes in
percent of ship acquisition cost, for a given type of ship.
Combatant and auxiliary ships will be treated as disparate
types
.
The information presented in Chapters III and IV will
be combined to develop a Naval ship system design cost-
effectiveness function for those design tasks common to the
three design approaches used since 1960. The return from
increased scope of effort expended on these common tasks of
ship system design will be quantitatively assessed, and the
level of effort at which marginal return in terms of reduced
changes cost is equal to marginal cost in terms of increased
design cost will be established. That level of effort at
which marginal return is equal to marginal cost, is the cor-
rect amount of effort to expend on development of contract





APPROACHES TO NAVAL SHIP SYSTEM DESIGN
Introduction
This chapter of the thesis will review the different
approaches used in the Naval ship system design process
over the past 15 years. The prominent features of each
approach will be presented and compared as background for
the development of Naval ship system design costs in Chapter
III and Naval ship system design effectiveness in Chapter
IV. The design tasks common to all three approaches will be
identified
.
Three distinctly different approaches to Naval ship
system design have been used during the past 15 years.
Prior to about 1965, the design approach was what is now
called the "Conventional" approach [3, 19, 37]. During the
mid-1960' s, the total package procurement (TPP) weapon
system acquisition approach was developed, resulting in the
ship system design approach called Concept Formulation/
Contract Definition (CF/CD) [1, 31, 48, 49, 50, 52]. The
CF/CD approach was terminated as the decade of the 1970'
s
started, and replaced by the present approach to ship system
design. The prominent features of each approach are dis-
cussed in this chapter. The discussion is intended only to
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highlight the prominent features of each approach for com-
parison purposes, and is not intended as an exhaustive
treatment of the subject of Naval ship system design. The
reader interested in more detail should consult the refer-
ences cited.
Figure 1 provides a comparison of the terminology
and sequence of events as practiced in each of the three
approaches [19] . It should be noted that the detail design
and working drawings are produced by the shipbuilder in all
three approaches. This thesis is concerned with system
design as opposed to detail design. Ship system design
encompasses all the design activity from the beginning of
feasibility studies through the completion of contract
design.
Present Naval Ship System Design Approach
Figure 2 illustrates the key features of the present
ship system design approach, and the sources of these fea-
tures. In essence, the present approach is an attempt to
combine the best of conventional and CF/CD approaches, and
at the same time incorporate additional desirable features.
The objectives, products, and process of each phase of the
present approach are summarized in Figure 3 [51]
.
Under the conventional ship system design approach,
the "Customer's Requirements" were provided to NAVSEC in
the form of "single sheet characteristics." Actually, this
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brief description of the type of ship desired, including
specification of speed, endurance, weapons and sensors,
crew size, and frequently the type of propulsion plant [37]
.
During the conventional design process, the characteristics
were sometimes modified as a result of design trade-off
studies. The trade-off studies were guided by the Ship
Characteristics Board (SCB) , a group of high-ranking officers
in OPNAV. The overall ship characteristics were approved by
the SCB during preliminary design. The membership of the
SCB was not static during the time between completion of
preliminary design and delivery of the ships to the fleet;
consequently a Board comprised of different people was some-
times unhappy with the ships when the ships were delivered.
Beginning with the Guided Missile Frigate (FFG7) in
1971, a Top Level Requirement/Top Level Specifications pro-
cedure was implemented as a replacement for "single sheet
characteristics." The Top Level Requirements (TLR) document
is a detailed description of the capabilities to be provided;
and, in addition, contains considerable philosophy about
factors to be considered as governing during trade-off
studies [41] . The TLR document is produced in rough draft
form by the Chief of Navl Operations (OPNAV) , then sent to
the Naval Ship Engineering Center (NAVSEC) . Operators and
designers jointly produce the final draft in smooth form
during conceptual and preliminary design. The final form
is a document of 100 pages or more and describes in detail
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the ship system characteristics and capabilities in the lan-
guage of the operator
.
The Top Level Specifications document is produced by
NAVSEC during preliminary design. This is a complete 200-
300 page engineering description of the ship system charac-
teristics and capabilities, and is written in engineering
language [41] . Upon completion of preliminary design, the
TLR/TLS documents are carefully reviewed and differences
adjudicated. Both documents are signed by NAVSEC and OPNAV,
thus forming a "contract" between the engineers and the
operators. The effort expended in developing the TLR/TLS
documents is cooperative in nature and specifically for the
purpose of ensuring that the ship to be built is what the
Operating Navy wants, as well as documenting operator par-
ticipation in conceptual trade-off studies [18] . Extensive
documentation of all trade-off studies is maintained, and
systems engineering efforts are likewise extensive in the
joint effort to provide the "best" ship design to meet the
operator's needs. Virtually all "what-if" questions are
explored and the results documented to aid future review of
the process followed in selecting the ship characteristics
.
After the TLR/TLS documents are signed, the design
proceeds into the contract design phase, which also differs
substantially from the conventional design process in that
ship designers are "farmed-in" from a designated lead ship-
builder and an alternate lead shipbuilder as advisory par-
ticipants in the contract design phase. The purpose of
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shipbuilder participation is to enhance producibility and
reduce acquisition cost. The completion of contract design
is followed by award of a contract for building the lead
ship, with the detail design being performed by the lead
shipbuilder or his design agent. Detail design work is done
under a contract separate from the shipbuilding contract.
The detail design and construction experience gained during
lead-ship construction is then "fed-back" to NAVSEC and
incorporated in the follow-ship contract design.
A design management team of six to eleven personnel
are dedicated full time to the design effort from initiation
of conceptual design through completion of contract design
in order to provide continuity from one design phase into
the next phase, and to facilitate the close control neces-
sitated by "Design to Cost" constraints. Design optimiza-
tion is based primarily on minimum acquisition cost. Life
cycle costs are given due consideration when future costs
can be predicted with confidence.
Control of technical risk is provided by detailed
plans for ship test and evaluation (T&E) in parallel with
the design effort [44] . The objective is to apply the "Fly
Before Buy" concept to the extent feasible in ship acquisi-
tion. High risk subsystems are identified, and detailed
plans for testing and evaluating those high risk items are
developed. For example, the FFG7 design included plans for
land based test facilities for the combat subsystem and
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propulsion subsystem. Land based tests are conducted while
the lead ship is under detail design and construction.
Design elements involving crew training, maintenance
support concepts and facilities, and spare parts support are
also developed in parallel with the ship design under the
present approach. This effort is termed Integrated
Logistics Support (ILS) , and is described more fully in
references [15, 33, 34, 44].
The products of each design phase are the results of
extensive trade-off studies and systems engineering efforts.
The resulting design is better documented, more thoroughly
studied, and more producible than under the conventional
approach. High risk subsystems are identified and tested
before proceeding with follow ship construction. Logistic
support is addressed early in the ship system design process
,
Concept Formulation/Contract Definition (CF/CD) Approach
A new way of producing ship system designs was intro-
duced in the mid-1960' s along with the Total Package Pro-
curement (TPP) concept. The method is called Concept
Formulation/Contract Definition (CF/CD) [1, 31, 48, 49, 50,
52] . "In-house" Navy studies during the concept formulation
phase identify the basic performance characteristics to be
provided by the ship. At first glance this seems similar to
the concept design phase of the conventional ship design
process; however, this is not the case. Concept formulation
is concerned with identifying and describing the performance

31
requirements as opposed to describing a ship system that
will meet OPNAV specified requirements. The concept formu-
lation output provides some basic guidance as to what type
of ship is desired; however, the guidance is deliberately
minimized in order to allow competing contractors the widest
possible latitude in producing a design to meet the require-
ments .
The most significant difference from conventional
concept studies is extensive application of systems analysis
in defining the performance requirements to be met. Exist-
ing design criteria are challenged and examined in depth
before being accepted as valid. The optimization criteria
is to maximize life cycle cost-effectiveness.
The output of concept formulation is a Request for
Proposals (RFP) for contractors interested in competing for
the award of a TPP contract of large magnitude. The RFP is
a request for contractors to present detailed plans for per-
forming a complete ship system design based on the specified
performance characteristics. The responses are prepared by
the contractors at no cost to the government and are evalu-
ated by the Navy. Two or more contractors are then awarded
fixed price contracts to develop the contract definition; a
complete shipbuilding proposal including contract plans and
specifications, detailed construction plans, and a complete
analysis of life cycle cost.
Each contract definition output is evaluated by the
Navy on the basis of technical excellence, planning, and
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costs. The most cost-effective proposal becomes the basis
of a TPP contract after incorporation of particularly
attractive portions of the other proposals
.
The products of the CF/CD concept formulation phase
were roughly equivalent to the feasibility studies products
shown in Figure 3 . The contract definition phase B-l prod-
ucts were roughly equivalent to the conceptual design prod-
ucts shown in Figure 3. The contract definition phase B-2
products were roughly equivalent to the preliminary design
products shown in Figure 3 . The contract definition phase
C products were roughly equivalent to the contract design
products shown in Figure 3
.
The "Objectives" and "Process" columns shown in
Figure 3 are somewhat different for the CF/CD approach, but
the products and design tasks performed are essentially the
same for CF/CD as those shown in Figure 3 in the "Products"
column.
"Conventional" Naval Ship System Design Approach
The approach taken in conventional ship design varied
from design to design, depending on the similarity between
the ship under consideration and existing ships. If the new
ship was to be an evolutionary development of an existing
type, it was frequently possible to improve and update a
"parent design," thereby reducing significantly the design
effort required. On the other hand, a revolutionary or rad-
ically different ship type might require an extensive
research and development effort.

33
The principal objective of conventional conceptual
design was to determine the range of feasible alternatives,
to conduct gross characteristics trade-off studies, and to
select the optimum alternative. The gross characteristics
such as length, beam, draft, and power, were established in
conceptual design. Principal weapons and sensors, number of
propellors, type of propulsion and required speed, and crew
size were usually specified by OPNAV.
Many of the operations performed in the conventional
conceptual design phase were redone in the conventional pre-
liminary design phase, but in greater detail and with better
information. Areas not considered in the conceptual design
phase were examined. Particular attention was given to the
problems of area and volumetric adequacy, and ship arrange-
ments
,
which were given only a rough check in the conceptual
design phase. With the development of hull lines, ship
model tests were initiated for more accurate determination
of the speed-power, maneuvering, and seakeeping characteris-
tics of the design. The end products of the preliminary
design usually included: [37]
1. General arrangement plans.
2. Lines and body plan.
3. Appendage plan.
4. Hydrostatic curves.
5. Midship section and special structural plans.
6. Weight, VCG and LCG estimates, tankage, etc.
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7. Speed-power estimate, propel lor performance,
and model test results.
8. Stability estimates, both intact and damaged.
9. Protection plans, including ballistic, under-
water, nuclear, and shock and blast protec-
tion.
The emphasis of conventional preliminary design was to pro-
vide a complete engineering description of the ship.
The conventional contract design phase followed pre-
liminary design and carried the design through another com-
plete cycle of even greater detail and finer definition.
Detailed shipbuilding specifications were prepared, and as
many as a hundred contract drawings and contract guidance
plans would be produced. The emphasis was to produce a
"biddable package," i.e., enough detail to allow prospective
building contractors to prepare accurate bids. However,
compared to CF/CD or the present approach to designing ships,
the conventional approach was a lower level of effort, pro-
duced entirely "in-house" by NAVSEC designers.
The conventional conceptual design phase essentially
combined the feasibility studies and conceptual design
phases shown in Figure 3. The conventional conceptual
design approach did not include the draft TLR or TLS section
two shown in the "Products" column of Figure 3. Also, the
dedicated management team concept was not used with the con-
ventional ship system design approach.
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The conventional preliminary design phase was similar
to the present approach, but the following products, shown
in Figure 3 for preliminary design under the present




Combat System Management Plan
Land Based Test Site Management Plan
T&E Master Plan
RMA Analysis
Also, the manning requirements, noise evaluation, and shock
(ship protection) requirements did not receive the level of
attention provided by the present approach.
The conventional contract design phase included the
same products as those shown in Figure 3 for the present
approach , with the exception of the planning documents for
detail design and construction. Under the conventional
approach to Naval ship system design these planning docu-
ments were prepared outside the design group, and the cost
of preparing detail design and construction plans was not
considered a design cost. Also, backup analytical studies
were not as extensive under the conventional approach, as




Comparison of Approaches to Naval Ship System Design
Extensive application of systems analysis techniques,
team management, ILS, T&E, RMA, and thorough documentation
of results was not employed in conventional ship system
design. In general, the ships were "optimized" to a speci-
fied level of performance. Cost was an important but not
overriding consideration. The results were certainly ade-
quate but hardly "optimal" according to a systems analysis
definition. Advancing technology, increasing complexity of
combatant ships, and the development of systems analysis
techniques provided both the impetus for, and method of,
developing a more thorough and more rigorous approach to
Naval ship system design.
The introduction of "Design to Cost" and "Fly Before
Buy" acquisition strategies have resulted in some features
of the present design approach that were not part of conven-
tional or CF/CD approaches . The TLR/TLS procedure and
detail design feedback into the follow-ship contract design
are examples of new features.
Design tasks included in the present and/or CF/CD
approaches, but not included in the conventional approach
include:











Other design tasks that today receive much greater
attention than under the conventional approach include
:
1. Ship manning analysis.
2. Noise analysis.
3. Cost analysis.
These three tasks, together with RMA and systems anal-
ysis tasks comprise the bulk of the "systems engineering"
effort expended in the present ship system design approach.
All of the design tasks performed in conventional
ship system design are also performed under the CF/CD and
present approaches; therefore, the design tasks associated
with the conventional approach will be used as a baseline
defining those design tasks common to all three approaches.
Dedicated team management, ILS and T&E Planning, TLR/TLS
development, and "systems engineering" tasks were not includ-
ed in the conventional ship system design approach; there-
fore, the cost of performing these tasks will be deleted
from the total ship system design cost of the present and
CF/CD approaches in order to place all three approaches on
a common cost basis.
Summary and Conclusions
Three different approaches to Naval ship system
design have been reviewed. The design tasks common to all
three approaches have been identified as those design tasks
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performed under the conventional approach. The design tasks
performed under the conventional approach have been estab-
lished as a baseline for comparison of ship system designs
produced by different design approaches.
The baseline design tasks are the hard-core engineer-
ing effort, that is, the part of design effort that contrib-
utes to the technical accuracy of contract plans and speci-
fications . The non-conventional design tasks not included
in the baseline tasks may have a very large pay-off in
terms of optimizing the gross characteristics of the ship,
reducing life cycle costs, and ensuring smooth introduction
into the operating fleet; however, the nature of these non-
conventional tasks clearly indicates that non-conventional
design tasks do not significantly improve the technical
accuracy, clarity, or consistency of the contract plans and
specifications
.
The effectiveness of the hard core engineering effort
(conventional design tasks) can be measured by the cost of
contract changes caused by deficiencies in contract plans
and specifications. This thesis will not attempt to measure
the effectiveness of non-conventional design tasks.
Chapter III will present the cost of producing sev-
eral Naval ship system designs . The cost of non-conventional
design tasks, corrected for inflation, will be compared.
Chapter IV will present the cost of contract changes caused
by design deficiencies. The cost of contract changes caused
by design deficiencies will be compared to the cost of
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COST OF NAVAL SHIP SYSTEM DESIGN
Introduction
This chapter of the thesis will present the cost of
ship system design for several classes of Naval ships . The
cost of non-conventional design tasks will be segregated
from the total ship system design costs. The cost of the
conventional ship system design tasks will be adjusted to
constant Fiscal Year 1976 dollars by applying a cost index
based on the cost per man day of design effort.
The acquisition cost of the lead ship of each class
will be presented, along with the average acquisition cost
per ship for each class. The acquisition cost will be
adjusted to constant Fiscal Year 1976 dollars by applying a
shipbuilding cost index developed from material and labor
cost indices.
The cost of the conventional ship system design tasks
will be expressed as a percentage of ship acquisition cost
for each ship class in order to take into account differences
in ship system complexity. Ship system acquisition cost is
proportional to ship system complexity, and ship system
design cost is proportional to ship system complexity for
constant design effectiveness. By expressing ship system
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design costs in percent of ship system acquisition cost, the
effect of ship system complexity is taken into account for
a given type of ship. Combatant and non-combatant ships
will be treated as disparate types.
Cost of Naval Ship System Design
The cost of developing a set of contract plans and
specifications for a Naval ship is influenced by the effi-
ciency of the design effort, by the complexity of the design,
and by the completeness of the design [17] . Efficiency,
complexity, and completeness can be further subdivided as
shown in Figure 4
.
The efficiency of the design effort is a measure of
the amount of work done that is actually incorporated in
the final plans and specifications in proportion to the
total effort. Design rework due to changes in externally
imposed constraints or requirements is an example of inef-
ficient design work. This thesis will not attempt to meas-
ure the efficiency of design effort; however, some allow-
ance will be made for obvious duplication of design effort.
It is recognized that efficiency differences will introduce
some data scatter, but the impact is believed to be small
and within the range of error inherent in the data.
The complexity of the design is taken into account
by expressing design cost in percent of acquisition cost.
It has been stated that both design cost and acquisition
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glance this appears to be a statement of an obvious truth,
but note that nothing has been said about the factor of
proportionality or the functional form relating cost to
complexity. The words "taken into account" should not be
interpreted to mean that the effect of ship system complex-
ity has been eliminated. Expressing design cost in percent
of acquisition cost is the author's method of making an
allowance for differences in ship system complexity. Com-
plete elimination of the effect of complexity is not claimed
and should not be inferred.
The effects of ship system complexity would be com-
pletely eliminated by expressing design cost in percent of
acquisition cost if and only if both design cost and acqui-
sition cost are related to complexity by one of the func-
tional forms
:
1. Cost = oX
2. Cost = aXX
X X3. Cost = ae or aB
where X is complexity, a is a constant of proportionality,
e is the natural log base, and 6 is a constant. The effects
of complexity are not completely eliminated if cost and com-
plexity are related by any other functional form, or if
design cost and acquisition cost are related to complexity
by different functional forms. Both design cost and acqui-
sition cost must be related to complexity by the same func-
tional form, and that form must be one of those listed
above if the effect of ship system complexity is to be
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completely eliminated by expressing design cost as a per-
cent of acquisition cost. The functional relationship
between cost and complexity is not known; therefore, the
act of expressing design cost in percent of acquisition
cost is merely a method of making an allowance for the
effect of ship system complexity.
The effect of software complexity is eliminated by
determining the cost of software, and deleting that cost.
Software includes technical documentation and reports of
supporting studies, planning documents, design histories,
data collection, and computer programs. The elements in-
cluded in software complexity are non-conventional design
tasks and are, therefore, not included in the cost of the
conventional elements of ship system design.
The completeness of the design is the principle fac-
tor being investigated in this thesis. The completeness of
the design effort in terms of the number of alternatives
considered, the level of detail of the design studies, and
the number and type of products resulting from the design
effort, is the principle factor affecting the cost of the
conventional elements (hard-core engineering tasks) of the
ship system design. The quality of the contract plans and
specifications is dependent primarily on the completeness
of the design effort. The cost of contract changes caused
by deficiencies in the contract plans and specifications




The cost of developing the contract plans and speci-
fications for different classes of Naval ships has been
strongly affected by inflation. The historical cost per
man-day of design labor is shown in Figure 5, and has been
used to develop the labor cost index shown in Table 1. The
labor cost index in Table 1 is applied to the actual "then-
year" ship system design costs in order to express the
design cost in constant Fiscal Year 1976 dollars.
The actual cost of developing the contract plans and
specifications for twelve classes of Naval ships has been
taken from references [2, 4, 29, 38, 39, 46]. The actual
ship system design cost, the ship system design year, the
design labor cost index, and the ship system design cost in
constant Fiscal Year 1976 dollars are shown in Table 2.
The question of design efficiency is brought out
again in Table 2 in the case of the FF1052 design, and the
DD963 design. The FF1052 design was actually completed to
the point of having a Request for Proposals (RFP) issued to
prospective ship builders. The original design had provided
for pressure-fired boilers. Technical difficulties were
being experienced with pressure-fired boilers at that time,
and a decision was made to recall the RFP and rework the
design to incorporate conventional boilers. The records are
not detailed enough to determine accurately the impact of
this decision on the design cost, hence, the cost spread



























Figure 5. Historical Cost Per Man Day of Ship System Design
Labor at Naval Ship Engineering Center [30, 38].
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Table 1. Naval Ship Engineering Center Labor Index, 19 60-
1976 [30, 38]
.
Fiscal Ship System Design Labor
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Table 2. Naval Ship System Design Costs in Millions of
Dollars [4, 29, 38, 39, 46].
Ship Ship System
System Ship Design Cost
Design System Labor Index in FY76
Ship Cost Design To FY76 Dollars
Class $ Millions Fiscal Year Dollars $ Millions
CG26 4.2 1961 3.0 12.6





















scs 9.5 1974 1.1 10.5
AE26 0.4 1963 2.6 1.0
LSD37 0.8 1964 2.4 1.9
LKA113 0.8 1965 2.2 1.8
AOR1
Notes: a.
0.7 1965 2.2 1.5
Insufficient data for more accurate determina-
tion.
b. One contractor plus one-third of Navy review
costs plus $10 million spent on system design
after contract award. Source: Deputy Project





The DD963 design was completed under the CF/CD
approach. Three contractors competed during the CD phase,
and the Navy reviewed the work of all three contractors.
The actual amount spent by the contractors is unknown. In
addition to these uncertainties, the ship system design
effort continued for nearly a year after the CD phase was
completed and the contract for construction was awarded.
Rather than allow such obvious distortion of cost data, the
author has estimated the DD963 ship system design cost. The
estimate consists of the amount actually paid to one con-
tractor (all three contractors were paid the same amount)
,
plus one-third of the Navy review costs, plus an estimated
$10 million spent on ship system design after construction
contract award. These estimates are based on a conversa-
tion with the Deputy Project Manager (formerly Technical
Director) of the DD963 acquisition program [2]
.
The remaining cost information presented in Table 2
is believed accurate within + 10 percent for designs pro-
duced prior to 1970 , and accurate within two or three per-
cent for designs produced since 1970.
Cost of Non-Conventional Elements of
Naval Ship System Design
The cost of the non-conventional elements of Naval
ship system design must be separated from the total ship
system design cost shown in Table 2 in order to place all
the ship classes on a common design cost basis. The non-








6. Weapons and software development.
Thus, the elements of ship system design listed in
the Figure 3 products column, and not listed above, are the
conventional elements of Naval ship system design.
The cost of the non-conventional design elements are
shown in Tables 3 through 6 for ship designs produced under
the present and CF/CD approaches. These costs have been
taken from references [4, 29, 39, 46]. Table 7 summarizes
the non-conventional design costs. Table 7 shows that 50
to 59 percent of total ship system design cost is spent for
non-conventional elements in combatant ship system design,
and 28 to 30 percent of total ship system design cost is
spent for non-conventional elements in non-combatant ship
system design.
Cost of Conventional Elements of
Naval Ship System Design
The ship system design cost remaining after deletion
of the cost of non-conventional design elements is, by def-
inition, the cost of the conventional elements of ship
system design. The cost of the conventional elements of
ship system design is shown in Table 8 for twelve classes
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and cost in constant Fiscal Year 1976 dollars are also
shown in Table 8
.
The cost of DD963 conventional elements of ship
system design could not be determined from the records
available. The cost shown in Table 8 for DD963 is an esti-
mate based on CGN38 non-conventional cost ratio (60 percent
non-conventional)
. The total cost of DD96 3 ship system
design was also an estimate, hence the cost of the conven-
tional elements of DD963 ship system design shown in Table 8
is the result of two sequential estimates and should be
viewed with considerable skepticism. The cost data for the
sea control ship design was not detailed enough to break
conceptual and preliminary design costs into conventional
and non-conventional elements. The non-conventional ele-
ments were estimated at 3 percent of the total ship system
design cost, based on SCS contract design cost ratio (c.f.
Table 5) and A0177 preliminary and contract design cost
ratios (c.f. Table 6).
Ship acquisition cost has been strongly influenced by
inflation in recent years. The inflation rate for ship-
building is not the same as the inflation rate for design
labor. Also, the period of time over which inflation acts
is not the same for ship system design as for ship construc-
tion; therefore, a shipbuilding cost index separate from
design labor cost index is required in order to show ship
acquisition cost in constant Fiscal Year 1976 dollars.
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Two types of shipbuilding cost indices are maintained
by the Naval Sea Systems Command. The first type is used
for calculating payments to shipbuilders under the economic
escalation clause in the shipbuilding contract. This cost
index is based on Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) cost
indices for shipbuilding material and shipbuilding labor.
The BLS indices are equally weighted. It is generally
recognized by the Navy and contractors alike that the result-
ing "BLS 50-50 cost index" does not fully account for the
cost increases experienced for Naval ship construction. The
BLS indices are used for computing escalation payments pri-
marily because the indices are maintained by a disinterested
party, and not because the index is the most accurate reflec-
tion of Naval shipbuilding costs available. The BLS ship-
building material index does not fully account for the cost
increases experienced in Naval ship construction materials.
Furthermore, the shipbuilder's overhead and profit are not
taken into account at all in computing the BLS 50-50 index
[5].
The NAVSEA cost estimating group maintains a separate
shipbuilding cost index for cost estimating purposes. The
index used for cost estimating purposes includes the full
impact of Naval ship material costs, shipbuilder overhead
and profit, and the estimated impact of economic and ship-
building marketing factors. The index used for cost esti-
mating purposes more accurately accounts for all the factors
influencing the cost of Naval ships; unfortunately, the
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index is considered sensitive and cannot be published in an
unclassified paper [5] . The solution to this dilemma is a
compromise cost index based on the NAVSEA material cost
index and the BLS labor index, equally weighted. The result-
ing cost index, shown in Table 9, is better than the BLS 50-
50 index, but not nearly as good as the NAVSEA cost estimat-
ing index.
Ship acquisition cost extracted from [40] is shown
in Table 10 for twelve classes of Naval ships, along with
the shipbuilding year, and the ship acquisition cost in con-
stant Fiscal Year 1976 dollars. The data in Table 10 show
that the cost index in Table 9 does not fully account for
inflation. Compare the cost of AOR-1 class ships in FY1976
dollars ($74M) to the cost of A0177 class ships in FY1976
dollars ($98M) . The AOR-1 class ships are larger and more
complex than A0177 class ships and certainly cannot be
acquired for less than A0177 class ships in 1976. Also,
CG26 class ships, shown at a cost of $140M in Table 10, can-
not be built for less than DD963 class ships, shown at a
cost of $179M in Table 10. It is apparent that the cost
index being used does not fully account for inflation; how-
ever, it is the best information publishable and will be
used throughout this thesis. It will be shown that the
results obtained in Chapter IV are sensitive to errors in
the shipbuilding cost index, hence, the reader should keep
in mind the shortcomings of the index being used.

60
Table 9 . Shipbuilding Cost Index to Convert To Fiscal Year
1976 Dollars Based on NAVSEA Material Index and














1964 3.18 2.01 2.59
1965 3.05 1.97 2.51
1966 2.90 1.92 2.41
1967 2.75 1.83 2.29
1968 2.61 1.80 2.21
1969 2.46 1.66 2.06
1970 2.28 1.59 1.94
1971 2.09 1.53 1.81
1972 1.86 1.45 1.66
1973 1.62 1.38 1.50
1974 1.41 1.25 1.33
1975 1.20 1.13 1.17
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The cost of ship system design, and the ship acqui-
sition cost have been presented, and correction has been
made for inflationary effects. The cost of the conventional
elements of ship system design is shown as a percent of lead
ship acquisition cost and average ship acquisition cost in
Table 11. The historical trend of the cost of conventional
elements of ship system design is shown in Figure 6 through
11.
The Sea Control Ship (SCS) is classified by the Navy
as a combatant ship. The SCS has a combatant mission; how-
ever, the ship is more similar to a non-combatant ship from
the viewpoint of the ship system designer. This author has
classified the SCS as a non-combatant ship for the purpose
of ship system design based on the austerity and simplicity
of the SCS platform, compared to frigates, cruisers, destroy-
ers and attack aircraft carriers.
In general, the cost of the conventional elements of
ship system design has been smaller for non-combatant ships
than for combatant ships. This is true both in absolute
dollars and in percent of acquisition cost.
Examination of Figures 6 through 11 reveals some
interesting historical trends . Figures 6 and 7 show that
the total cost of ship system design, in percent of acquisi-
tion cost, has been increasing. The trend in Figure 6 is
very clear in the case of non-combatant ships. Figure 7 dis-
plays considerable variation in the total cost of combatant
ship system design, but the trend is clearly increasing.
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Table 11. Cost of Conventional Elements of Naval Ship System
Design as a Percentage of Ship Acquisition Cost.
Design* Percent of Design* Percent of













Notes: Design* is the Conventional elements of Naval ship
system design.
All costs converted to 1976 Dollars before express-
































I i i i i I i i i i I I
i i i I i i i
1960 1965 1970 1975
SHIP SYSTEM DESIGN FISCAL YEAR
Figure 6. Historical Trend of Total Cost of Naval Ship
System Design in Percent of Average Ship
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Figure 7. Historical Trend of Total Cost of Naval Ship
System Design in Percent of Average Ship
Acquisition Cost for Combatant Ships.
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The data point for DD963 shown in Figure 7 has been ignored
in drawing the trend line due to the sequential estimating
procedure used to obtain the data point.
The total cost of ship system design shows an increas-
ing percentage of ship acquisition cost. Figures 8 and 9
show that the cost of the conventional elements of ship
system design also displays a trend of increasing percentage
of ship acquisition costs for non-combatant ships . The
trend is more pronounced in Figure 9 , where ship system
design cost is shown in percent of average ship acquisition
cost as opposed to lead ship acquisition cost.
Figures 10 and 11 show that the cost of the conven-
tional elements of ship system design displays considerable
scatter in percentage of combatant ship acquisition cost.
It should be noted that the FFG7 data point shown in Figure
11 is an estimate based on a 50 ship program. Recent actions
by Congressional Committees indicate that the FFG program may
be cut severely, which would result in a higher average ship
cost and lower percentage spent for hard-core engineering
tasks.
The trends shown in Figures 6 through 9 are in the
direction recommended by the SCN Pricing and Cost Control
Study and by the Navy Marine Acquisition Review Committee.
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Figure 8. Historical Trend of Cost of Conventional Elements
of Naval Ship System Design in Percent of Lead
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Figure 9. Historical Trend of Cost of Conventional Elements
of Naval Ship System Design in Percent of Average
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Figure 10. Historical Cost of Conventional Elements of
Naval Ship System Design in Percent of Lead Ship
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Figure 11. Historical Cost of Conventional Elements of
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The cost of ship system design has been presented for
twelve classes of Naval ships. The cost of non-conventional
design tasks has been separated, and the remaining cost (cost
of conventional design tasks) has been adjusted for infla-
tion. Non-conventional design tasks such as design manage-
ment, TLR/TLS development, T&E, and ILS planning, systems
engineering, and weapons and software development amount to
50 to 59 percent of the total design cost for combatant
ships and 28 to 30 percent for non-combatant ships.
The ship acquisition cost was presented for the same
twelve classes of Naval ships. The acquisition cost was
adjusted for inflationary effects. The shipbuilding cost
index used is imperfect but is based on the best data pub-
lishable.
The cost of the conventional elements of ship system
design was expressed in percent of ship acquisition cost.
The historical trends reveal an increasing percentage of
ship acquisition cost is being expended on the conventional
elements of ship system design for non-combatant ships. The
data scatter does not reveal any clear trend for combatant
ships
.
Chapter IV will present the cost of contract changes
caused by deficiencies in the contract plans and specifica-
tions. The cost of changes will be adjusted for inflation
and expressed in percent of ship acquisition cost. The cost
of changes caused by design deficiencies will be compared to
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EFFECTIVENESS OF NAVAL SHIP SYSTEM DESIGN
Introduction
This chapter of the thesis will present the cost of
contract changes caused by ship system design deficiencies.
The cost of contract changes will be adjusted for inflation-
ary effects by applying the shipbuilding cost index from the
midpoint of ship construction to mid-1976
.
The cost of changes caused by design deficiencies, in
constant fiscal year 1976 dollars, will then be expressed in
percent of lead ship and average ship acquisition cost in
order to take into account differences in ship system com-
plexity. The cost of changes caused by ship system design
deficiencies is proportional to ship system complexity for
a constant level of design effectiveness, and ship system
acquisition cost is also proportional to ship system complex-
ity. The effect of ship system complexity is taken into
account by expressing the cost of changes caused by design
deficiencies in percent of ship system acquisition cost.




Measure of Naval Ship System Design Effectiveness
The conventional elements of Naval ship system design
defined in Chapter II are hard-core engineering tasks. The
conventional elements of design are responsible for the
technical accuracy of the contract plans and specifications.
The non-conventional elements do not contribute toward
improving the technical accuracy, consistency, completeness,
or clarity of the contract plans and specifications; how-
ever, the non-conventional elements may have a very large
payoff in terms of ship system performance, reduced life
cycle costs, and smoother introduction of the new ship into
the fleet. The effectiveness of non-conventional elements
of Naval ship system design will not be determined in this
thesis.
The effectiveness of the effort expended on the con-
ventional elements of Naval ship system design will be meas-
ured by the cost of contract changes caused by deficiencies
in the contract plans and specifications. The recommenda-
tions of the SCN Pricing and Cost Control Study, the find-
ings of Meiners, and the NMARC recommendation to continue
increasing the scope of effort going into preparation of
contract plans and specifications imply that more design
effort should result in fewer and less costly changes
caused by deficiencies in the contract plans and specifica-
tions. It is primarily due to these recommendations that
the author has chosen the cost of contract changes caused by
design deficiencies as a measure of ship system design
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effectiveness, rather than some unquantifiable attribute
such as performance or a less meaningful measure such as
number of pages of specifications, number of plans, or
number of mistakes in the plans and specifications.
Chapter III presented data on the level of effort
expended on the conventional elements (hard-core engineering
tasks) in preparation of contract plans and specifications.
It was shown that the historical level of effort has varied
considerably among Naval ship system designs. It was fur-
ther shown that, although the total level of design effort
has been increasing, the level of effort expended on hard-
core engineering tasks has been too erratic to draw any con-
clusion for combatant ships. This chapter will show that
the effect of variations in the level of hard-core engineer-
ing effort is clearly evident in the amount of money spent
on contract changes caused by deficiencies in the contract
plans and specifications.
Causes of Contract Changes
Deficiencies in contract plans and specifications is
only one cause of contract changes, there are many other
causes. Meiners reported that the more significant causes,
in order of impact on cost growth, include:
1. Change in operational requirements.






Changes in program direction/funding other
than change in quantity.
4 Change to incorporate newly achieved state-
of-the-art.
5. Research and development performed in pro-
duction contracts
.
This author has broadened the definition of cause
number two above. Viewed from the standpoint of the ship
system designer, the contract plans and specifications are
deficient if they are incomplete, inconsistent, in error,
unclear, insufficient in level of detail of system/subsystem
definition, insufficient in level of detail of system/
subsystem interface definition, or inadequate in terms of
weight and space allocation for detail design development.
Any contract change caused by one or more of these condi-
tions is classified as a "Design Deficiency" in this thesis.
Implementation of Contract Changes
Contract changes are implemented by a Headquarters
Modification Request (HMR) or by a Field Modification
Request (FMR) . Changes implemented by HMR tend to be fewer
in number, but more expensive than changes implemented by
FMR. A change caused by a design deficiency may be imple-
mented by either HMR or FMR, depending on the nature and
cost of the change.
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Method of Collecting Design Deficiency Data
The HMR and FMR are contractual documents. The cause
underlying the HMR or FMR is not always indicated by the
contractual document, and classification of the HMR/FMR on
the basis of title alone is often misleading and inaccurate.
The technical documentation supporting the HMR/FMR must be
reviewed in order to accurately classify the change accord-
ing to the underlying cause. Fortunately, it is a general
practice to file each HMR/FMR, supporting technical documen-
tation, and pertinent correspondence together in a single
file folder. Had this not been the case, the research
effort would have been beyond the scope of a thesis
.
The method of collecting design deficiency data con-
sisted of reviewing the file folder for each HMR/FMR and
classifying the underlying cause on the basis of information
contained in that folder.
The time required for the research effort was reduced
significantly by several techniques. These included the
following:
1. Any HMR/FMR that resulted in no change in
price was ignored.
2. Certain types of changes occur repeatedly,
and can be identified on the basis of
title alone. An example is "Repair GFE."
3
.
The Engineering Change Proposal that ini-
tiated the change was frequently included
in the file folder, and contained the
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"Reason for Change" in block 17 of the
standard form used for Engineering
Change Proposals
.
These three techniques allowed most HMR/FMR changes
to be classified by underlying cause in a matter of a few
minutes for each change. However, a significant number of
changes required additional research, and some required the
aid of personnel assigned to the ship acquisition project
staff, before the cause of the change could be determined.
With the HMR/FMR classified by underlying cause, the
next step was to establish the change in price. When the
change had resulted in a Priced Supplemental Agreement, the
change in price was certain. In some cases the HMR/FMR had
been issued as a unilateral change order by the Navy, with
the price to be negotiated later "pursuant to the changes
clause" of the contract. In these cases the Navy estimated
cost of the change was used; the actual change in price is
uncertain, but the estimate is based on the best information
available. Changes resulting in a reduction in price were
included in the data collected. A reduced price change
reduces the cost of changes caused by design deficiencies.
The cost of shipbuilder claims against the Navy have not
been included in the data, with one exception.
The shipbuilder generally will file a claim against
the Navy if the shipbuilder's profit is in jeopardy, and
will use every means at his disposal to improve his profit
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position. The more common elements of a claim against the
Navy include:
1. Disruption and delay due to:
a. Late or defective GFE.
b
.
Late or defective GFI , other than con-
tract plans and specifications.
c. Technical direction by personnel
other than the contracting officer
(constructive change)
.
2. Deficient contract plans and specifications.
3. Any decision or act, or lack of a decision
or act, on the part of the Navy that has
the effect of increasing the shipbuilder's
costs.
Claims against the Navy are usually settled by nego-
tiation between shipbuilder and Navy attorneys. The settle-
ment is frequently the result of an agreement between attor-
neys and is based more on the practical aspects of arranging
a quick and equitable settlement than on the technical merits
of each separate issue. In fact, the final agreement fre-
quently does not describe the technical issues, nor does it
allocate an amount to each issue. In general, determination
of the exact amount of a claim allocable to a specific defi-
ciency in contract plans and specifications is impossible.
Therefore, the cost of claims that are the result of defi-
ciencies in contract plans and specifications is not included
in the data with the following exception.
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The AE26 class contract plans and specifications con-
tained a very serious engineering error in that the speci-
fied scantlings were insufficient. The Navy issued a uni-
lateral mandatory change order to correct the deficiency.
The shipbuilder refused to negotiate a price for that change,
and ultimately included it as an element of a claim against
the Navy. In this case the scantling deficiency change was
settled as a separate claim item, and the cost allocable to
that change was clear. This change was a glaring example of
deficient design; the cost was clearly known, and the cost
was so large (90 percent of total cost of design deficiency
changes for the AE26) that it would be misleading to not
include the claim cost in this case. It is an exception
that the author feels necessary in order to present the true
impact of deficient design in the AE26 class acquisition
program. It is admittedly inconsistent to include the cost
of only this claim, but the truth would suffer more if the
cost of this particular claim were not included in determin-
ing the cost of design deficiencies for the AE26 class.
The effect of inflation was taken into account by
applying the shipbuilding cost index from the midpoint of
ship construction to mid-1976. The effect of inflation had
to be taken into account since the period of time over which
inflation acts and the rate of inflation for change costs is





The data collected for the lead ship of each class
are shown in Table 12. The total cost of changes caused by
design deficiencies is shown, along with the fiscal year of
the midpoint of construction, the shipbuilding cost index,
and the cost of design deficiency changes in constant Fiscal
Year 1976 dollars. The cost of lead ship changes in percent
of lead ship acquisition cost is also shown.
The cost data for the CG26 class lead ship is based
on incomplete data. The FMR records for this class were com-
plete; however, 32 out of 281 file folders were missing from
the HMR records. A total of 281 HMR changes were made; the
file folders for HMR 169 through HMR 200 could not be loca-
ted. The cost of changes caused by design deficiencies
shown for CG26 must, therefore, be considered low. The 32
missing file folders constitute 11 percent of the changes
made by HMR.
The costs shown in Table 12 for CGN36 are considered
accurate and complete. The CGN38 data are accurate but not
complete simply because the ship has not been delivered to
the Navy; however, the ship construction is nearly complete;
and the author considers it unlikely that any further changes
will be made due to design deficiencies.
The DD963 data are accurate and complete for the lead
ship. It should be noted the ship system design for DD963
was completed in June, 1971, nearly one year after award of
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were made during the year between contract award and com-
pletion of ship system design, including six changes result-
ing in a significant decrease in ship cost. The data shown
in Table 12 do not include the cost (increased or decreased)
of any changes made prior to June, 1971, because the ship
system design was not considered complete until June, 1971.
The data shown in Table 12 for LSD37, LKA113, AE26
,
and A0R1 are reasonably complete and accurate. Note that
90 percent ($1.0M) of the cost of lead ship changes for AE26
is due to a claim caused by a mandatory change order issued
to correct deficient scantlings
.
The data for FFG7 are preliminary and should be con-
sidered a lower bound since the ship will not be delivered
until mid-1977. Significant growth in the cost of changes
caused by design deficiencies is not anticipated; however,
some additional growth will undoubtedly occur.
The change records for the FF10 52 acquisition program
were only partially available. The data that could be
obtained was so distorted by special deferred work cost
accounts, claims, and multiple shipbuilders, that the author
was unable to use it; hence, the FF1052 acquisition program
is not included in this chapter. It is estimated that a
minimum of six man-months of effort would be required to
collect the FF1052 data, and sort out all the distorting
influences [47]
.
The data in Table 12 together with the data in Table
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Figure 12. Naval Ship System Design Cost-Effectiveness
Function for Lead Ship or Single Ship Buy.
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the author's estimate of probable error in repeatability of
the data by a different researcher. The boxed data points
show the cost effectiveness function, along with the proba-
ble error band in a manner similar to the design "lanes"
used by a ship system designer for tentative selection of
hull form coefficients.
It is clear from Figure 12 that increasing the level
of effort expended on hard-core engineering tasks reduces
the cost of changes caused by design deficiencies; however,
the payoff of increased effort exhibits decreasing marginal
returns as the level of effort is increased. The payoff for
combatant ships decreases rapidly as the level of effort
exceeds 3 1/2 percent of lead ship acquisition cost. The
payoff of increased design effort is approximately a con-
stant ratio of 1.5 units reduction in changes cost for each
additional unit spent on hard-core engineering at levels
of effort below about 3 1/2 percent of lead ship acquisition
cost.
It should be noted that the very small cost of changes
due to design deficiencies shown for DD963 may be the result
of the TPP contracting strategy rather than due to extreme
excellence of the design. The shipbuilder is responsible
for correcting design deficiencies at no cost to the Navy,
except in cases of dispute over the existence of a design
deficiency. In some cases, the Navy may judge the design
deficient, and want a design change, while the shipbuilder
may judge the design to be fully adequate. In these cases
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the Navy must pay to have a design change implemented. The
error box for the DD963 has been extended to the right to
reflect the uncertainty about this point. Also, recall that
the DD963 design cost is based on estimated data.
The payoff of increased design effort is also appar-
ent for non-combatant ships, but the level at which the pay-
off starts decreasing is not as clear simply because no data
points exist at high enough levels of design effort. The
payoff must decrease as the level of effort is increased
above three percent of lead ship acquisition cost, but the
exact break-point in the curve is not clear. The payoff
appears to be approximately a constant ratio of 1.5 units
reduction in changes cost for each additional unit spent on
hard-core engineering at levels of effort below about 2 1/4
percent of lead ship acquisition cost.
The optimum level of design effort is at the point
where the slope of the cost effectiveness function is
minus one. It is at this point that the last unit spent on
design reduces the cost of changes caused by design defi-
ciencies by exactly one unit. Spending more on design will
result in a reduction of less than one unit in design defi-
ciency changes cost for each unit spent on design. Spend-
ing less on design will result in an increase of more than
one unit in design deficiency changes cost for each unit
saved in design costs. "Design" means the conventional ele-
ments of Naval ship system design in this discussion.
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The optimum level of design effort appears to occur
at 3 1/2 percent ( + 1 percent, - 1/2 percent) of lead ship
acquisition cost for combatant ships, and at 2.7 percent
(+ 1/2 percent) of lead ship acquisition cost for non-
combatant ships. Note that DD963, CG26, CGN38, and LSD37
data points show that more than the optimum amount of effort
was expended on these designs, indicating that sufficient
design capacity exists to support an optimum level of effort.
The cost-effectiveness function shown in Figure 12
applies only to the lead ship of a lead-follow acquisition
strategy, or to a single ship buy. The fixed costs of an
acquisition program, such as design, land based test sites,
etc., can be amortized over a larger number of ships if
several ships are acquired on one contract. Also, the time
delay involved in a true lead-follow acquisition strategy
may be unacceptable in some acquisition programs. The exact
size of buy required to apply the lead-follow approach is a
matter of uncertainty, but most Ship Acquisition Project
Managers agree that a minimum of 10 to 20 ships are needed
in order to take best advantage of the lead-follow approach.
Ship acquisition programs smaller than 10 to 20 ships would
very likely follow the more traditional approach of buying
all ships on one multiship contract. The question of "How
much design is enough" remains to be answered for a multi-
ship acquisition program.
The cost of design is shown in percent of average ship
acquisition cost in Table 11. The average cost per ship of

oo
changes caused by design deficiencies is shown in Table 13
.
Previous comments regarding the quality of the data still
apply
.
The difference between Table 12 and Table 13 is not
large, but is significant in that fixed acquisition costs
are amortized over all ships in the class on an equal basis.
Also, the cost of changes in later ships in the class is
generally less simply because the changes are made at an
earlier stage in ship construction.
The data in Table 13 is combined with that in Table
11 and plotted in Figure 13, resulting in a Naval ship
system design cost-effectiveness function for multiship pro-
grams on a per ship basis. It should be noted that only
those ships in the initial contract award for each class
have been included in the data for Table 13 and Figure 13.
When additional ships of the same class are awarded on a
second or subsequent contract, changes made prior to award-
ing the subsequent contract are usually incorporated in the
subsequent contract at the outset. The result is that the
cost visibility of those changes is lost, and in fact the
cost may actually be zero for some changes since the neces-
sity for making a change during construction is eliminated
and the detail design work has been paid for in the previous
contract.
Figure 13 applies to a multiship acquisition program
but only on a per ship basis. The cost of changes caused by
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AVERAGE COST PER SHIP OF CHANGES
CAUSED BY SHIP SYSTEM DESIGN DEFICIEN-
CIES IN PERCENT OF AVERAGE SHIP ACQUI-
SITION COST




design costs shown are for the entire ship acquisition pro-
gram. In order to use Figure 13 to determine the correct
amount of design effort for a multiship contract, two more
steps are necessary.
Figure 13 shows the average cost of changes per ship
due to design deficiencies as a function of the level of
design effort. In terms of total program costs, the cost
of changes shown in Figure 13 must be multiplied by the num-
ber of ships in the contract for each point on the curve.
The effect is to shift the point at which the slope is minus
one. This reflects the fact that the correct level of de-
sign effort is affected by the size of buy. Alternatively,
the design cost can be divided by the number of ships in the
contract to place design cost on a per ship basis along with
changes cost.
Figure 14 shows a family of curves for different size
ship buys; developed by dividing the design cost shown in
Figure 13 by the number of ships in the buy, and plotting
the design cost per ship versus the cost of changes due to
design deficiencies per ship, for each size buy. The point
at which the slope is minus one is marked on each curve.
The final step is to plot the correct level of design
effort (slope equal to minus one) for each size of buy.
This has been done in Figure 15, along with the author's
estimated error band. The error band is based on the
author's estimate of repeatability of data. No allowance is
made for possible error in the shipbuilding cost index devel-
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Naval Ship System Design Cost-Effectiveness
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Figure 15. Optimal Level of Effort for Conventional Elements
of Naval Ship System Design for Combatant Ships.
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Figure 15 shows the optimal level of effort to expend
on the conventional elements of Naval ship system design for
any size buy up to 20 ships. Figure 15 applies only to com-
batant ships, and only to acquisition programs for which all
ships are bought in a single contract. Figure 15 does not
apply to the follow ships of a lead-follow acquisition
strategy.
The curve shown in Figure 13 for non-combatant ships
is too flat to allow development of a curve similar to
Figure 15 for non-combatant ships . The point at which the
minus one slope occurs is very near the left hand end of
the curve shown in Figure 13 . Expanding the changes axis
by multiplying by the number of ships forces the point of
minus one slope off the left hand end of the curve.
Summary and Conclusions
The cost of contract changes caused by design defi-
ciencies has been presented. The costs have been adjusted
for inflationary effect by means of a shipbuilding cost
index, and the effect of ship system complexity has been
taken into account by expressing the cost of changes in per-
cent of ship acquisition cost.
Cost effectiveness functions were developed for both
combatant and non-combatant lead ships or one ship buys . It
was shown that the optimum level of effort to expend on the
conventional elements of Naval ship system design is about
3 1/2 percent (+1, -1/2 percent) of lead ship acquisition
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cost for combatant lead ships or one ship buys. This level
of design effort would be optimal for a lead-follow acquisi-
tion program if and only if the cost of design deficiency
changes is zero for the follow ships.
It was shown that the optimum level of effort to
expend on the conventional elements of Naval ship system
design is about 2 1/2 percent (+ 1/2 percent) of lead ship
acquisition cost for non-combatant lead ships, or one ship
buys. The recommended level of design effort would be opti-
mal for a lead-follow acquisition program if and only if the
cost of design deficiency changes is zero for the follow
ships
.
Present design capacity is sufficient to support an
optimum level of effort; however, it is the author's opinion
that the level of manning that can be effectively utilized
must also be considered. Attempts to complete the design
work in a shorter time by assigning more people to do the
work will compound design management problems, result in
more rework, and generally reduce the efficiency of the ef-
fort. In extreme cases, attempts to compress the design
schedule will increase the probability of serious error,
with consequent costly changes later, regardless of the
amount of money spent or level of manpower devoted to the
effort.
The optimal level of effort to expend on the conven-
tional elements of Naval ship system design was developed
for multiship buys of combatant ships . The optimal level of

96
effort varies from 0.4 percent to 4.5 percent of the total
acquisition cost for the entire program depending on the
number of ships bought on a single contract. It was not pos-
sible to develop the optimal level of design effort for
multiship buys of non-combatant ships, due to the shape of
the cost-effectiveness function for non-combatant ships.
It is concluded that acquisition cost can be reduced
by expending the optimum level of effort on the conventional
elements of Naval ship system design. The total acquisition
cost, including the cost of design and the cost of changes
caused by deficiencies in the contract plans and specifica-
tions, will increase if a non-optimum level of effort is
expended on design. The effectiveness of non-conventional
design tasks has not been addressed. No data exist as of
the date of this study to assess the cost-effectiveness of
ship system design for the follow-ship of a lead-follow
acquisition approach.
Chapter V will summarize the findings of this thesis,
state conclusions, present suggestions for using the infor-





SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter will present a summary of the thesis,
state answers to the research questions, state general con-
clusions, and make suggestions for further study.
Summary
The objective of this thesis was to answer the pri-
mary research question of "What is the optimum level of
design effort?" or "How much design is enough?" Corollary
questions were:
1. Can acquisition cost be decreased by increas-
ing the scope of design effort?
2. Does sufficient design capacity exist to
support an increase in the scope of design
effort?
Chapter II presented a brief overview of the differ-
ent approaches to Naval ship system design. The ship system
design tasks common to all the different approaches were
identified and labeled the "conventional elements of Naval
ship system design," or the "hard-core engineering design
tasks of Naval ship system design."
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Chapter III presented the cost of ship system design
for twelve classes of Naval ships. It was shown that the
total design effort has been increasing in both absolute
terms and in percent of ship acquisition cost. The effort
expended on the hard-core engineering tasks has been
increasing in both absolute terms and in percent of ship
acquisition cost, for non-combatant ships. The effort
expended on the hard-core engineering tasks for combatant
ships displays too much scatter to show any clear trend.
Chapter IV presented the cost of changes caused by
deficiencies in contract plans and specifications. The cost
of these changes was compared to the cost of the conven-
tional elements of ship system design for each class, and a
cost-effectiveness function was developed.
The data collected and presented in Chapter IV is
affected by subjective judgment on the part of the author.
The collection and analysis of the data was not a straight-
forward "look up the facts" effort. Several thousand con-
tract change file folders had to be examined, and the con-
tents of each folder had to be subjected to the author's
judgment in determining whether or not the change was caused
by a deficiency in contract plans and specifications. Con-
siderable data manipulation was necessary throughout the
thesis, to allow for inflationary effects and to make an
allowance for differences in ship system complexity.
The shipbuilding cost index used is known to be
imperfect. Error in the shipbuilding cost index can affect
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the shape of the cost-effectiveness curves; consequently,
the optimum level of design effort is also affected by
error in the shipbuilding cost index. These facts should
be kept in mind while considering the conclusions and recom-
mendations to follow. The conclusions are based on more
factual evidence than any previous study, but the factual
evidence is not completely free of distorting influences.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The thesis has now reached a point where conclusions
can be presented
.
The first conclusion is that the level of effort
expended on the conventional elements of Naval ship system
design affects the cost of contract changes caused by defi-
ciencies in the contract plans and specifications. The total
ship acquisition cost, including the cost of ship system
design, can be reduced by expending the optimum level of
effort on the conventional elements of ship system design.
Spending one unit less than the optimum will result in more
than one unit increase in the cost of changes. Spending one
unit more than the optimum will result in less than one unit
saving in the cost of changes. The fact that an optimum
exists is a direct consequence of the fact that the effec-
tiveness of increasing levels of design effort exhibits
decreasing marginal returns.
The second conclusion is that the optimum level of
effort for the conventional elements of Naval ship system
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design is about 3.5 percent (+ 1 percent, - 0.5 percent) of
the lead ship acquisition cost for combatant lead ships or
single ship contracts. This level of effort is recommended
by the author. This level of effort is optimal only for the
first ship of a new class of a reasonably well-known ship
type; it does not apply to an updated design of an existing
class, or to the design of a revolutionary ship type, or to
the follow ships in a lead-follow acquisition program. The
recommended level of effort is optimal for a lead-follow
acquisition program if and only if the cost of changes
caused by design deficiencies is zero for the follow ships.
The third conclusion is that the optimum level of
effort for the conventional elements of Naval ship system
design is about 2.5 percent (+0.5 percent) of the lead ship
acquisition cost for non-combatant lead ships or single ship
contracts. This level of effort is recommended by the
author. This level of effort is optimal only for the first
ship of a new class of a reasonably well-known ship type; it
does not apply to an updated design of an existing class, or
to the follow ships in a lead-follow acquisition program.
The recommended level of effort is optimal for a lead-follow
acquisition program if and only if the cost of changes
caused by design deficiencies is zero for the follow ships.
The fourth conclusion is that the optimum level of
effort for the conventional elements of Naval ship system
design for multiple-ship contracts for combatant ships
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varies from 0.4 percent to 4.5 percent of total program
cost, depending on the number of ships bought on one con-
tract. Data limitations precluded development of a similar
conclusion for non-combatant ships. Data does not exist for
the follow ships in a lead-follow acquisition program.
The fifth conclusion is that sufficient ship system
design capacity exists to implement the recommended level of
design effort, based on the fact that several recent ship
system designs have absorbed more effort than the recom-
mended amount. It may be necessary to adjust design and
acquisition program schedules somewhat to avoid overloading
the design capacity, but the recommended level of effort is
believed to be feasible.
It is the author's opinion that design and acquisi-
tion programs should be scheduled to maintain a constant
design workload near design capacity, but care should be
taken to avoid overloading the design capacity, particularly
when the overload is due to an accelerated design schedule.
Attempts to rush the design process will undoubtedly
increase the probability of serious error, with consequent
costly changes later, regardless of the amount of money
spent or level of manpower devoted to the effort.
The sixth conclusion is that the total impact of
expending a non-optimum level of effort on the conventional
elements of ship system design is small. The potential
return from an optimum level of design effort is worthwhile,
but not large. The potential reduction in total acquisition
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cost is less than three percent. If the design cost for the
CG26 had been reduced by four percent of lead ship acquisi-
tion cost, the cost of changes would have increased by about
one percent of lead ship acquisition cost, leaving a net
saving of about three percent. If the design cost for the
FFG7 or the AE26 had been increased by one percent of lead
ship acquisition cost, the decrease in the cost of changes
would have been less than two percent, leaving a net saving
of less than one percent.
A three percent saving in a billion-dollar program is
certainly worthwhile, but probably not as significant as
savings that might result from other actions . Increasing
the level of systems analysis effort in the selection of
gross ship characteristics might well result in savings more
significant than choosing the optimum level of effort to
expend on hard-core engineering design tasks.
The return from increasing the level of effort
expended on the non-conventional elements of ship system
design, including systems analysis techniques, has not been
determined. It is recommended that further research be con-
ducted to determine the optimum level of effort to expend on
the non-conventional elements of Naval ship system design.
The results of that research, combined with the conclusions
reached in this thesis, will provide a more complete answer
to the question of "How much design (total) is enough?" The
author suggests that the role of the non-conventional ele-
ments of ship system design in determining the "design to"
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requirements, selecting the gross ship system characteris-
tics, and reducing life cycle costs may be more significant
than the role of the conventional elements in reducing the
cost of changes.
Finally, additional research is recommended to deter-
mine the cost-effectiveness of reworking the contract plans
and specifications for the follow ships in a lead-follow
acquisition approach. It is a widely held opinion that
rework of the contract design, incorporating all that has
been learned from the detail design and construction of the
lead ship, should significantly reduce the cost of changes
in the follow-ships
. The cost of reworking the contract
design, and the effectiveness in reducing the cost of fellow-
ship changes should be determined. The total cost of con-
tract design rework plus the cost of follow-ship changes
caused by design deficiencies should be compared to the cost
of follow-ship changes caused by design deficiencies when
the contract design is not redone. Future data from the
FFG7 program can be compared to the data presented in this
thesis to determine whether or not the lead-follow acquisi-
tion approach is cost-effective. It is suggested that the
value of "time-to-acquire" should be addressed by the same
research effort.
The author believes that the information and recom-
mendations contained in this thesis are worthy of considera-
tion by Ship Design Managers and Ship Acquisition Project
Managers. A worthwhile saving in total ship acquisition

104
cost can be achieved by using as a guide the recommendations
presented here, tempered by experienced judgment and any
unique requirements of the individual design and acquisition
program. The author will be grateful if this work is
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